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FINANCIAL REGULATION REFORM: 
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
James A. Fanto* 
INTRODUCTION 
e have been living through one of the worst financial and eco-
nomic crises since the Great Depression. Several storied finan-
cial institutions collapsed or disappeared through mergers, in the space of 
weeks. Major banking conglomerates Citigroup and Bank of America, 
and the largest insurance conglomerate, American International Group, 
remain in trouble and have been propped up by massive government aid. 
The federal government had also to assume control of the government 
sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are financial 
institutions that fund home mortgages. In the crisis, financial firms essen-
tially stopped financing consumer and commercial activities because of 
concern over their own solvency and that of their counterparties; this sit-
uation of systemic risk in turn led to a severe economic downturn. When 
the financial system and the economy stopped functioning, the federal 
government provided emergency capital to financial firms and instituted 
programs to take troubled assets off of their books, and additionally insti-
tuted a stimulus to kick-start the economy. 
The initial and emergency government legislation was spearheaded by 
the Bush Administration and was then continued by the Obama Adminis-
tration.1 However, amid the financial and economic chaos, there were 
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 1. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008) (“EESA”). EESA established the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”) that gives the U.S. Treasury the authority to purchase or guarantee up to $700 
billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions. Under the authority of EESA, the 
Treasury established the Capital Purchase Program, which allowed it to provide direct 
capital support to financial institutions. When the Obama Administration took over in 
2009, it continued the approach of shoring up the capital positions of major financial 
conglomerates. Moreover, the Treasury instituted the “Financial Stability Plan” to put 
financial institutions and the financial system back on a sound footing. See U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, http://www.financialstability.gov (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (describing the 
plan’s projects). This plan included a program of continuing to provide capital to finan-
cial institutions (now renamed the “Capital Assistance Program”) and to “stress test” the 
largest, most systematically important financial institutions to ensure that they had 
enough resources to weather the crisis. For the stimulus legislation that the Obama Ad-
W
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clearly problems in financial institutions and with financial regulation 
that had contributed to the massive crisis; these would take considerable 
time and thought to address. After over nine months in office, the Obama 
Administration finally proposed a reform plan for the financial system 
(the “Plan”), the implementing legislation of which is working its way 
through Congress.2 I contend that, in its initial outline, the Plan let pass a 
unique opportunity to address the failings of finance and financial institu-
tions that contributed to the current crisis and that will generate future 
financial cataclysms. The Plan does this by maintaining the existence, 
and emphasizing the importance, of the large diversified financial con-
glomerates that are engaged in an array of financial activities and that 
typify modern finance. At most, it extends regulation to the “shadow 
banking system,” i.e., the financial institutions, like hedge fund groups, 
that are the unregulated counterparts to the financial conglomerates. The 
obvious question is why the Plan does not propose significant reform of 
the financial conglomerate itself. Like others, I believe that this adminis-
tration, just as other administrations before it, has been “captured” by 
finance in a complex, ideological way.3 However, as Congress has been 
debating and revising the legislation implementing the Plan, the Admin-
istration and financial regulators have adopted a more critical stance to-
wards the financial conglomerates. This may suggest that fissures are 
beginning to form in the dominant ideological straightjacket concerning 
finance and financial conglomerates that has constrained the views of 
senior policy-makers in recent years. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly outlines the story of the 
triumph of finance over the last three decades, which has been accepted 
by senior policy-makers and regulators, and the creation and dominance 
of the large financial conglomerates. It then contrasts this story with an 
alternative account of the harms caused by finance and the conglome-
rates. Part II explains how several proposals in the Plan—its enhance-
ment of the power of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (the “Federal Reserve”), its reform of risk management, and the es-
tablishment of a consumer financial protection agency—reinforce the 
dominance of financial conglomerates in our financial system and the 
significant risks that such dominance poses to the system and the econo-
                                                                                                             
ministration proposed and saw enacted, which included regulation of compensation in 
financial firms receiving government aid, see American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (“ARRA”). 
 2. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FIN. SUPERVISION 
AND REG. (2009) [hereinafter A NEW FOUNDATION]. 
 3. See, e.g., Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (May 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/7364/. 
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my. Part III outlines an alternative approach that would counter the pow-
er of, and put an end to, the financial conglomerates. This approach in-
cludes removing government support from the large financial firms while 
providing bank regulators with the power to place the conglomerates into 
conservatorship and receivership. This Part also explains why the Obama 
Administration’s preference for incremental reform of the financial con-
glomerates will not succeed, because the firms will control and thus un-
dermine the reforms. Part V concludes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Triumph of Finance 
The last two decades of the 20th century and the first decade of the 
21st century represent a triumph of finance, at least until the current fi-
nancial crisis.4 First, during this period, there has been a tremendous 
growth in theoretical and empirical understanding about financial institu-
tions, markets, and instruments. To name just a few examples, one thinks 
of the theory of efficient markets and the related concept of optimal in-
vestment portfolios, the financial and disciplinary value of debt, and the 
understanding and pricing of options. This understanding partly respond-
ed to demand: during this period, massive amounts of funds flowed into 
the financial sector from individuals who had to pay for their retirement 
from their own investments.5 
As the story goes, finance triumphed because it benefited ordinary citi-
zens and businesses, and thus the larger economy. It made investing 
scientific, primarily by offering strategies to deal efficiently with risks. 
For example, investors were taught that they could create a diversified 
portfolio that would eliminate many of the risks associated with investing 
in securities and that would be cost efficient.6 They were also offered a 
wide, and sometimes bewildering, array of financial instruments (chiefly 
derivatives) to address other risks in an investment portfolio. Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 4. For a scholarly account of this transformation, see ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW 
FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003). For a journalistic account, see 
JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND 
DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2003). 
 5. See e.g. STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 252 (1997). 
 6. The diversified risks would eliminate the unsystematic risks associated with indi-
vidual securities, leaving for investors only the fundamental risks associated with all 
securities. See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 
(1996). This insight spawned the index fund, made famous by Vanguard. See JOHN C. 
BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 139–214 (2005). 
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finance gave firms new ways to think about capital structure and numer-
ous tools to deal with their risks (again, derivatives).7 Finance also es-
poused agency theory and, as a result, provided new perspectives on firm 
governance, particularly to address longstanding problems of manage-
ment.8 For instance, paying executives in stock options was based upon a 
financial assumption that the problem of managers acting contrary to 
shareholder wealth would best be solved if the interests of the two groups 
were aligned. Securitization, which sparked the current crisis, was also 
an invention of finance—it allowed persons to invest confidently in risky 
assets through a diversification strategy (i.e., the assets, such as home 
loans, were numerous, geographically diverse, and pooled).9 
According to the story, finance benefited everyone. With the help of 
hard-edged financiers, American industry became more focused on its 
task of delivering wealth to shareholders as it embraced the lessons of 
finance.10 Ordinary investors found that they were no longer limited in 
their choice of investments, for now they had an array of old and new 
financial products to pick from, depending upon their preferences and 
investment goals.11 Significantly for the purposes of evaluating the caus-
es of the crisis, almost any consumer could take advantage of financial 
products that allowed him or her to purchase homes and consumer goods 
and that could be tailored to meet the consumer’s personal circums-
tances.12 
The U.S. financial industry became one of the most significant sectors 
in the country and the envy of the rest of the world. It grew significantly, 
                                                                                                             
 7. See JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 258–86 (10th 
ed. 1995). 
 8. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 51–
102 (1998). 
 9. Securitization, or structured finance, is simply the process whereby long-term 
receivables, such as loans, are transformed into securities. This occurs when the recei-
vables are pooled in a legal vehicle and securities (generally debt) are issued on the basis 
of the pool. For example, an investor who would be reluctant to fund one home mortgage 
can purchase debt securities whose payment of principal and interest is funded by thou-
sands of home mortgages on properties throughout the country. See generally Dwight 
Jaffee et al., Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis, in VIRAL 
V. ACHARYA & MATTHEW RICHARDSON, RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO 
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM  61, 68 (2009). 
 10. See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL 
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 91–
123 (1998). 
 11. See ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 161–81 (1998). 
 12. On the growth in mortgage loans prior to the crisis, see Jaffee et al., supra note 9, 
at 61–82. 
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occupying an increasing share of the gross domestic product and employ-
ing large numbers of people, particularly from elite educational back-
grounds.13 The paradigm of the financial industry was the financial con-
glomerate, which combined financial sectors such as commercial bank-
ing, investment banking, and insurance. Since all financial institutions 
deal with investment and risks, it seemed to make sense to create an in-
stitution that offered the full array of financial products and services.14 
This conglomerate could be created only when legal restrictions dating 
from the aftermath of the Great Depression that separated commercial 
banking from other kinds of finance were finally changed to allow the 
linking of financial services.15 Participants in the financial services in-
dustry became wealthy as a result of the triumph of finance, but this out-
come was justified (so the story went), for they were receiving their 
share of the wealth and benefits that they produced for the country.16 
B. Another Perspective on Finance 
There is another story of modern finance than this one of unalloyed 
benefits—and the financial crisis has brought this alternative account to 
the foreground. Without entering into longstanding debates, I contend 
that there is a valid argument that the financial industry destroyed, rather 
than improved, many companies and industries under the guise of finan-
cial rationalization.17 Financial specialists took control of companies, 
saddled them with debt, and ensured that—through fees, dividends, and 
other payouts—the specialists would be enriched no matter the ultimate 
fate of the firms. Finance’s view of the firm as a financial puzzle for val-
ue maximization was adopted by company senior executives, who parti-
cipated in going private or sales transactions. Executives also embraced 
the finance model of stock option-based compensation, which allowed 
                                                                                                             
 13. It is reported that, before the crisis, the financial sector produced approximately 
40% of U.S. corporate profits. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 4. 
 14. See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 11, at 50–86. 
 15. For a brief discussion of these institutions and the legal background to their for-
mation, see Anthony Saunders et al., Enhanced Regulation of Large, Complex Financial 
Institutions, in VIRAL V. ACHARYA & MATTHEW RICHARDSON, RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 139–56 (2009). 
 16. See generally Thomas Philippon & Ariel Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in 
the U.S. Financial Services Industry: 1909–2006 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14644, 2009) (arguing that during two periods in the last century, 
compensation in the financial industry has been overly generous compared to what the 
market can support). 
 17. See PHILIP AUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS: HOW THE INVESTMENT BANKS 
PLAYED THE FREE MARKET GAME 204–21 (2005). 
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them to propel their compensation into the stratosphere.18 Thus, rather 
than Wall Street being a service provider and thus subservient to the cap-
ital raising purposes of Main Street businesses, the roles were reversed, 
which contributed to a “hollowing out” of management and industry in 
this country.19 
The story about the benefits of finance to ordinary investors and con-
sumers is also less convincing now in light of the losses caused by the 
financial crisis. The crisis brought to the forefront new examples of the 
repeated practice of financial professionals pushing investors into in-
vestments that often have higher commissions and higher risks than were 
represented: auction-rate securities and collateralized debt obligations 
that lost significant value in the financial meltdown come to mind.20 
Moreover, the crisis resulted in staggering investment and household 
wealth losses, which might take years to recoup.21 In addition, many of 
the financial products that were offered to consumers proved to be toxic 
to them and eroded their household wealth, yet were a bonanza for the 
financial industry. For example, many consumers were sold loan prod-
ucts that were unsustainable in likely scenarios, e.g. when real estate 
prices failed to rise.22 Once again, finance offered consumers an illusion 
                                                                                                             
 18. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 159–73 (2004) (discussing stock 
option practices that have increased executive compensation without regard to perfor-
mance). Executives also used tools offered by bankers to hedge their returns on this com-
pensation or to benefit in other ways from their executive positions (e.g., to receive 
shares from other companies doing initial public offerings). See NORMAN POSER & JAMES 
FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 13.07[H] (4th ed. 2007). 
 19. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE 
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY (2007) (explaining the shift from practical business im-
provements to market manipulation as stock came to be the driving force of the American 
economy over the course of the 20th century). 
 20. See, e.g., POSER & FANTO, supra note 18, § 1.02. 
 21. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUSTAINING 
THE RECOVERY 68 (Oct. 2009). As an aside, financial professionals offer favored inves-
tors trading strategies to obtain “alpha,” which is based upon, among other things, ineffi-
ciencies and trading patterns in the market. According to finance theory, the sophisticated 
trading makes the market more efficient and thus ultimately beneficial to investors. Yet 
financial professionals spend an inordinate amount of time and effort, and reap signifi-
cant profits, from this active trading based on market inefficiencies, which they conduct 
also for themselves as principals with high leverage. See JONATHAN A. KNEE, THE 
ACCIDENTAL INVESTMENT BANKER: INSIDE THE DECADE THAT TRANSFORMED WALL 
STREET 225 (2006). This suggests that, even when ordinary investors are not being 
pushed into expensive financial products, they are still passively investing in a market 
that is a profit source for the financial professionals. 
 22. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., THE U.S. HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: HOUSING AND HOUSING-RELATED FINANCE (2008). 
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of well-being with devastating consequences, such as personal bankrupt-
cy, loss of credit scores, and other personal hardships.23 
Furthermore, as the financial crisis has shown, the financial industry 
(particularly through financial conglomerates) creates economic and so-
cial instability by its activities. As a result of their involvement in asset-
backed securities and related derivatives, financial conglomerates, which 
control most of the financial assets in the country, had to be bailed out by 
the federal government in multiple and costly ways so that the financial 
system would not collapse and the funding necessary for basic economic 
functions would go on through these institutions.24 The crisis created a 
risk of collapse of the financial system (known as systemic risk) and ar-
rested economic activity, pushing the world economy into a significant 
recession.25 The government support came at a significant cost to taxpay-
ers, who themselves came to be the guarantors of the financial institu-
tions. In other words, financial conglomerates made the economic situa-
tion in this country highly precarious, with consequences of job loss and 
personal devastation to many individuals, while the institutions were 
bailed out by the government.26 
Finally, rather than producing a society where all boats rise through 
wealth it creates, finance arguably has led to an economic system that is 
politically destabilizing. In the words of economist Simon Johnson, as a 
result of finance the United States is increasingly a “banana republic” 
with a financial elite that owns or controls most of the country’s wealth, 
a growing impoverished underclass, and a shrinking middle class that is 
threatened with falling into the second group.27 This is a potentially unst-
                                                                                                             
 23. See generally CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY 
MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH (2008). 
 24. The importance of these financial conglomerates as providers of basic financial 
services was the justification used by the Obama Administration for their preservation. 
See Timothy Geithner, Treasury Sec’y, Secretary Geithner Introduces Financial Stability 
Plan (Feb. 10, 2009), available at www.ustreas.gov/pres/releases/tg18.htm. This is why 
federal financial regulators conducted a stress test only on the nineteen largest U.S. fi-
nancial institutions (it focused on banks with greater than $100 billion of assets, which 
are two-thirds of holding company assets today). See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FACT 
SHEET FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN, at 2 (Feb. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov; see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUGUST OVERSIGHT 
REPORT: THE CONTINUED RISK OF TROUBLED ASSETS, at 4 (Aug. 11, 2009). 
 25. See Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s-Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009: Causes and Remedies, in VIRAL V. ACHARYA & MATTHEW RICHARDSON, 
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 1–8 (2009). 
 26. The financial conglomerates and other financial institutions still hold troubled 
assets, which pose continuing problems to the institutions. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
supra note 24, at 3–4. 
 27. See Johnson, supra note 3. 
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able political outcome for a democracy, since, as seen in many Latin 
American countries, a country with such uneven wealth distribution is 
prone to slide into fascism, whether of the left or the right.28 This move-
ment into extreme wealth disparity corresponds with the last three dec-
ades of the triumph of finance. 
II. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S FINANCIAL REFORM PLAN AND ITS 
LIMITATIONS 
Given fundamental problems with the dominance of finance and with 
the financial conglomerates that constitute its paradigm, as outlined 
above, it is understandable that the initial Plan is a disappointment. The 
Plan preserves the status quo of large financial conglomerates and argua-
bly even enhances their importance in the United States. It thus reflects a 
relatively positive outlook on finance and financial professionals, a posi-
tion that strongly contrasts with the Administration’s stricter attitude to-
wards other nonfinancial industries that are experiencing trouble, such as 
the automobile industry. That is, even though financial firms brought the 
financial system to near collapse and the economy to its knees whereas 
the failure of automotive companies had no such systemic effects, the 
Administration initially took a supportive approach to the former and 
critical one to the latter.29 Recently, however, Treasury officials and fi-
nancial regulators, perhaps pushed by the growing criticism of the Ad-
ministration’s initial favorable treatment of financial conglomerates, 
have begun to be more critical of the conglomerates.30 
                                                                                                             
 28. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3; Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? Examining 
the Systematic Threats of Large Financial Institutions: Hearing before the Joint Econ. 
Comm., 111th Cong. (Apr. 21, 2009) (testimony of Simon Johnson, Professor, MIT Sloan 
Sch. Mgmt.). 
 29. For an outline of the Administration’s support of the U.S. automobile industry, 
see U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ROAD TO STABILITY: AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
FINANCING PROGRAM (Mar. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/autoprogram.html. It is curious that the 
stated justification for the automobile rescue package is “financial market stability,” but 
that reason has not prevented the government from allowing automobile companies to 
fail, although it has been reluctant to do the same for financial conglomerates. 
 30. This essay was written and revised in the latter half of 2009. Since that time, the 
Administration has become increasingly critical of financial conglomerates and has even 
made proposals dealing with limiting their size and activities. See, e.g., Press Release, 
White House, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on Size and Scope of Finan-
cial Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-
and-scope-financial-institutions-rein-e. 
2010] MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 643 
The following discussion highlights several examples of the orienta-
tion and limitations of the Plan. The examples are the proposed expanded 
role of the Federal Reserve as systemic risk regulator, risk management 
and related capital regulation reform, and the proposal to establish a con-
sumer financial protection agency. This Part explains how each of these 
proposals, even one potentially beneficial to consumers of financial 
products, reinforces the dominance of finance and financial conglome-
rates. It also refers to the emerging fissures in the Administration’s fa-
vorable view of financial conglomerates. 
A. The Expanded Role of the Federal Reserve 
A central part of the Plan would enhance the role of the Federal Re-
serve. Under current law, the Federal Reserve is the supervisor of the 
financial conglomerates, which in technical terms means that it is the 
designated regulator of bank and financial holding companies.31 Before 
the crisis, these included all the commercial banking conglomerates, such 
as Citigroup and Bank of America.32 However, the Federal Reserve’s 
supervisory role over the bank or financial holding company is limited 
by what is called “functional regulation.”33 That is, although the Federal 
Reserve is the regulator of the holding company, its supervisory role over 
the holding company’s subsidiaries is limited: the Federal Reserve is the 
primary regulator of a subsidiary only if that subsidiary does not have a 
“functional regulator.”34 For example, a commercial bank owned by a 
financial holding company would be regulated by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) or a state bank regulator, depend-
ing upon whether it is chartered as a national or state bank; an investment 
bank subsidiary would be regulated as a broker-dealer by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); any insurance subsidiary would be 
regulated by a state insurance regulator. In this scheme of regulation, the 
Federal Reserve must defer to a functional regulator with respect to regu-
lation of many of the most important parts of a financial conglomerate.35 
                                                                                                             
 31. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (2009). Since all the financial conglomerates have 
elected financial holding company status, my discussion focuses on the financial holding 
company regulatory status, not the bank holding company option. 
 32. For a list of financial holding companies, see The Federal Reserve Board: Finan-
cial Holding Companies, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fhc/ (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2010). 
 33. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (2009). 
 34. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(5). 
 35. Essentially, under § 1844 the Federal Reserve must defer to the functional regula-
tor’s overall regulation of the functionally-regulated subsidiary, to its examination of that 
subsidiary, to reports made by the subsidiary to the functional regulator, and to capital 
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The Plan would make the Federal Reserve a “super-regulator” for an 
expanded number of financial conglomerates, which would include both 
certain financial holding companies and also conglomerates currently 
outside its jurisdiction. In some cases, the Plan extends the Federal Re-
serve’s authority to include otherwise unregulated entities, such as hedge 
fund advisors, private equity firms, any of their funds, insurance groups, 
or any financial group the failure of which would pose a systemic risk to 
the financial system.36 Together, these conglomerates and other entities 
would be known as “Tier 1” financial holding companies.37 Under the 
Plan, the Federal Reserve would have direct supervision over these firms 
and their parts, with its supervisory power no longer circumscribed by 
the authority of functional regulators like the SEC.38 The legislation im-
plementing this part of the Plan, which is working its way through Con-
gress, establishes this primacy of the Federal Reserve in the regulation of 
these Tier 1 institutions, even though it has the Federal Reserve working 
cooperatively with other financial regulators.39 
The basic justification for expanding the Federal Reserve’s power is 
that the demise of any of the financial conglomerates, as seen in the fi-
nancial crisis, threatens the financial system, i.e., it creates “systemic 
risk.”40 Having numerous, independent regulators for the various parts of 
a financial conglomerate means that no one of them is responsible for the 
overall financial position and stability of the conglomerate itself and for 
its effects on the financial system as a whole. Moreover, without a “regu-
lator in chief,” exposures, activities, and risks within the conglomerate 
could escape regulation and oversight altogether. The Plan would remedy 
this regulatory failure by giving the Federal Reserve this regulatory task, 
although, as discussed below, the Federal Reserve would be helped in its 
                                                                                                             
standards for such subsidiary set by the functional regulator. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844 
(2009). 
 36. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 10–11, 21–24. Under current law, the 
Federal Reserve has jurisdiction over bank and financial holding companies only if a 
federally insured bank is a subsidiary of the holding company. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 
(2009). 
 37. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 22–24. 
 38. See id. at 19–22, 25–26. 
 39. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPROVEMENT ACT § 
1104 (discussion draft, Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. Again, since the 
time of writing and revising this essay, new legislation has been introduced with respect 
to financial reform. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
Summary: Restoring American Financial Stability (summarizing new Senate bill). This 
proposed legislation will not be discussed in this essay. 
 40. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
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efforts with respect to risk oversight by a council of the chief financial 
regulators.41 
There are several ways in which enhancing the role of the Federal Re-
serve supports and extends the dominance of financial conglomerates in 
the United States. First and obviously, this part of the Plan accepts the 
existence of the conglomerates as an unchangeable reality and implicitly 
rejects a logical alternative, which is to break them up. In other words, 
the Plan asserts that the status of the conglomerates cannot be ques-
tioned, and therefore that the only justifiable policy is to stabilize them 
and to deal with the risks that they pose to the financial system. Giving 
these institutions a special regulator reinforces the financial conglome-
rate as the norm. Moreover, expanding beyond financial holding compa-
nies the kinds of financial groups that would be Tier 1 holding compa-
nies only supports this perspective, since they, like the regulated con-
glomerates, are involved in complex and diverse financial activities. In 
sum, the status of the financial conglomerates is never questioned, even 
though the destruction caused by financial conglomerates has resulted in 
losses not only to shareholders but to many in the United States who 
have suffered from the recession and now bear the increased tax burden 
of the rescue programs.42 
In addition, giving the Federal Reserve this expanded regulatory role 
promotes financial conglomerates and thus “big” finance because, histor-
ically, the Federal Reserve has been the regulator that championed the 
creation of the conglomerate. The complete story of the erosion and de-
mise of the former legal structure in which financial services had to be 
kept apart is beyond the scope of this Article. A significant chapter in the 
story is the Federal Reserve’s support for ending the separation between 
commercial and investment banking, as well as between insurance and 
banking, and aggressively encouraging the formation of the U.S. finan-
cial conglomerate.43 Moreover, as has been abundantly clear throughout 
                                                                                                             
 41. Another part of the Plan (to be discussed in passing later) would give the Trea-
sury, aided by the Federal Reserve and other banking authorities the related power to take 
over and “resolve” a failing large financial group. See id. at 76–78. 
It must be emphasized that, in proposing the concept of a systemic risk regulator and 
primary supervisor of financial groups, the Administration drew support from scholars of 
financial regulation. See, e.g., Saunders et al., supra note 15, at 139. 
 42. It is odd that financial conglomerates have been treated much more gently than 
the industrial conglomerates that were takeover targets in the 1980s because the latter 
were seen to be destructive of shareholder value. For a critical summary of this perspec-
tive, see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 94–115 (1995). 
 43. See, e.g., LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 53–55 (3d ed. 2008). For a pano-
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the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve is inclined to protect large finan-
cial groups—even those that were previously outside its regulatory am-
bit, such as the large investment banks. The Federal Reserve has pro-
tected these groups even where this protection meant that it had to pick 
the survivors among the groups. It allowed Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley to become financial holding companies on an emergency basis in 
order to preserve their very existence;44 it helped engineer the sales of 
Merrill Lynch to Bank of America (a transaction that remains subject to 
litigation)45 and Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase;46 and it contributed to 
the efforts to keep insurance conglomerate American International Group 
afloat.47 Most of the programs in which the Federal Reserve participated 
during the financial crisis, such as those for reestablishing the market for 
asset-backed securities and removing toxic loans and securities from the 
books of financial firms, have been primarily designed to improve the 
financial position of the financial conglomerates.48 
                                                                                                             
ramic view of the regulatory and industry changes that produced the financial conglome-
rate, and their dangers, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Fi-
nancial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (2002). 
 44. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Be-
come Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A1. 
 45. See SEC v. Bank of America, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (a 
district court refused to accept a $33 million dollar settlement between the SEC and Bank 
of America on the issue of disclosure violations regarding the bonuses because is the 
settlement was “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate”); see also SEC v. Bank of 
America, 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (the same district court accepted a 
revised settlement). 
 46. In particular, the Federal Reserve made a $29 billion loan as part of J.P. Morgan’s 
purchase of Bear Stearns, with the loan being “non recourse” as to J.P. Morgan and only 
collateralized by $30 billion of Bear Stearns assets placed in a separate vehicle (with J.P. 
Morgan agreeing to take the first $1 billion loss on the collateral). See Turmoil in U.S. 
Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial Regulators Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of 
Jamie Dimon, CEO, JP Morgan Chase). See generally Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and 
Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 14, 134, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14134. 
 47. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM: STATUS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 28–30 (2009) (sum-
marizing the Federal Reserve’s assistance to AIG). 
 48. One program, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility or “TALF,” is 
designed to restart loan securitization outside the home mortgage context, an activity 
engaged in by the conglomerates. For complete information on this program, see BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, TERM ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES LOAN FACILITIES, 
(2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 
2010). Another is the public-private investment partnership, which is designed to fund 
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The Federal Reserve has consistently given the following public inter-
est defense for its actions with respect to the financial conglomerates: if 
one of them fails, the financial system and the economy may collapse, 
which will be destructive for everyone. It never explains why the finan-
cial system and the economy are dependent on this current configuration 
of financial institutions, other than the unspoken justification that this is 
the outcome that the “market” has given us.49 That the Administration’s 
point man for the Plan, Timothy Geithner, is an important Federal Re-
serve alumnus (former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York,) underscores how the Plan’s support of the current state of finance 
is overdetermined.50 
The Plan proposes that the Federal Reserve will enhance its oversight 
of Tier 1 financial groups or institutions using accepted methods of regu-
lating financial firms—improved capital, liquidity, and risk management 
standards.51 Capital requirements, the chief form of regulation, are based 
upon agency theory (again, the paradigmatic theoretical framework in 
finance) insofar as they require owners of a financial institution to have 
their own assets invested in the venture. This is thought to ensure that out 
of self-interest the owners will prevent their institution from participating 
in excessively risky investments and activities, for the owners would suf-
fer the initial losses. Capital requirements in financial institutions are 
“risk-based,” which simply means that the amount of capital required is 
determined by the risk of the institution’s investments and activities, as 
either measured by the risk models of the firm or in accordance with a 
risk determination pre-set by regulators.52 Yet risk models can be flawed 
and capital can turn out to be insufficient, as was seen during the crisis 
                                                                                                             
private investors so that they can remove toxic assets from financial institutions’ books 
(again, the financial conglomerates are holders of many of these assets). For a description 
of this program, see U.S. Dep’t of Treasury—Road to Stability: Public-Private Investment 
Program, http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/publicprivatefund.html (last 
visited May 23, 2010). Under the first program, which now can reach troubled assets as 
well as securities backed by new loans, the Federal Reserve provides low-interest loans to 
the private investors. For a critical discussion, see Office of the Special Inspector Gen. 
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Quarterly Rep. to Cong. 72–76 (2009). 
 49. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Before the H.R. Comm. on Financial Serv., 111th 
Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Hearing] (testimony of Daniel K. Tarullo, 
Member of the Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.). 
 50. Biography of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/organization/bios/geithner-e.shtml (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010). 
 51. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
 52. The subject of capital determination in financial firms is beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally PETER S. ROSE & SYLVIA C. HUDGINS, BANK MANAGEMENT & 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 475–98 (7th ed. 2008). 
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when numerous financial institutions proved to be inadequately capita-
lized in face of the losses triggered by the subprime loan meltdown.53 
Thus, enhanced capital regulation by the Federal Reserve is hardly com-
forting as a way to deal with the risks posed by the Tier 1 institutions, 
particularly since the Federal Reserve oversaw the capital positions of 
financial holding companies, like Bank of America and Citigroup, that 
nearly failed in the crisis.54 Moreover, one wonders how heightening 
capital requirements on financial conglomerates can ameliorate agency 
conflicts at all if, as is now clear, the federal government will not allow a 
Tier 1 institution to fail. The owners assume that their firm will never be 
allowed to fail, and their equity position will not be wiped out, thus mak-
ing the risk-exposure function of capital requirements almost meaning-
less.55 
Requiring a financial conglomerate to have adequate sources of li-
quidity is a response to the phenomenon that occurred during the crisis: 
firms collapsed or nearly did because they relied excessively on short-
term financing, which vanished in the crisis. International financial stan-
dard setters are now cautioning financial firms to be prepared for this 
“liquidity risk” by having funding that can see them through several 
years of hard times.56 This means that a firm has to alter its debt financ-
ing structure to make most of its funding long term. However, it is ques-
tionable whether any financial conglomerate can have enough liquidity 
to withstand a systemic crisis, which occurs because of its and other 
firms’ risky investments and because of their opaque relationships with 
each other. It must be remembered that even the “best” of the financial 
conglomerates, including Golden Sachs (which has occasionally asserted 
                                                                                                             
 53. See James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Manage-
ment in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 741–42 
(2009) [hereinafter Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable]. 
 54. The Federal Reserve claims that its supervision has always focused on the finan-
cial institutions that pose the greatest risk to the financial system. See FED. RESERVE BD., 
SUPERVISORY LETTER SR 08-9/CA 08-12, CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES AND THE COMBINED U.S. OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 
(2008), available at http:///www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/sr0809.htm. 
 55. As discussed below, the Plan does call for a plan for winding up financial con-
glomerates, but one has to wonder if this is legislative window dressing. 
 56. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 3 
(2008). 
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that it never needed a government rescue),57 would have collapsed in Oc-
tober 2008 without all of the government protections given to them.58 
The above discussion returns repeatedly to the concept of risk, which is 
the province of risk management and deserves a section of its own. 
However, as noted earlier, it is important to point out that the monolith 
mindset about the status quo of financial conglomerates is beginning to 
exhibit fissures. One example of the growing skepticism about the con-
glomerates is appearing in recent reflections on capital regulation for 
them. For example, Federal Reserve Governor Tarullo mentioned as a 
possibility a new “special capital requirement,” which would be in addi-
tion to capital requirements determined on a risk basis, to be imposed on 
the Tier 1 institutions.59 Such a charge, he implies, would in essence pe-
nalize large firms and discourage institutions, through this cost, from 
becoming conglomerates.60 Even Treasury Secretary Geithner discussed 
the possibility of limiting firm size when providing his views on a dis-
cussion draft of the proposed legislation enhancing the Federal Reserve’s 
powers. He made the following somewhat startling statement: “Regula-
tors must be empowered with explicit authority to force major financial 
firms to reduce their size or restrict the scope of their activities when ne-
cessary to limit risk to the system. This is an important tool to deal with 
the risks posed by the largest, most interconnected financial firms.”61 
                                                                                                             
 57. See Joe Nocera, Short Memories at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1. 
 58. Beyond the government’s capital infusion, these included the ban on short selling 
of the stock of financial institutions, access to discounted Federal Reserve loans, guaran-
tees of debt issued by financial conglomerates, and the rescue of AIG, which had finan-
cial conglomerates (like Goldman) as its counterparties. See Press Release, S.E.C., S.E.C. 
Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm; Press Release, Fed. 
Reserve, FOMC Statement (Oct. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081029a.htm; Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fed. Reserve, and Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., (Oct. 14, 
2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081014a.htm; Christine 
Seib, AIG Rescued by U.S. Fed. Reserve with $85bn bailout, TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 17, 
2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking 
_and_finance/article4771465. 
 59. See Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 49, at 4. Governor Tarullo described 
the charge as also being risk-based insofar as the charge would increase the more system-
ic risk an institution posed. 
 60. Governor Tarullo also referred to another possible reform related to capital: re-
quire financial conglomerates to have “contingent capital,” which means debt that, in 
certain circumstances, changes to equity. See id. at 4–5. 
 61. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on . Fin. Serv. 4, 111th Cong. (Oct. 29. 2009) [he-
reinafter Geithner Testimony] (Testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y of the Trea-
sury). Indeed, the Discussion Draft includes a provision allowing the Federal Reserve to 
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B. Risk Management, Centralization of Regulation, and Complexity 
As noted above, the Plan promises that the Federal Reserve will en-
hance risk management in the Tier 1 conglomerates or institutions. Addi-
tionally, the Plan proposes that a Financial Services Oversight Council 
be organized, which will, among other things, replace the President’s 
Working Group on financial markets. The Oversight Council will identi-
fy emerging risks in the financial industry.62 
A few words about risk management are in order here. The system 
commonly known as risk management in fact comprises both risk as-
sessment and risk management. Risk assessment is designed to identify 
the risks a financial institution faces from its investments and activities. 
The firm’s board and executives use the risk assessment to decide upon 
the appropriate risk profile for the firm and to ensure that the institution 
keeps within these boundaries and takes actions to minimize the losses 
associated with, and otherwise to address, these risks—this is risk man-
agement proper.63 Risk management is critical for financial institutions 
because the adequacy of a financial institution’s capital, which is the 
primary device for keeping the firm’s activities in check, is determined in 
accordance with a risk assessment of these activities and assets.64 Indeed, 
financial regulators permit financial conglomerates, such as those that 
would be designated Tier 1 under the Plan, to conduct this risk assess-
ment using the conglomerates’ own risk models and methods, rather than 
having to use the risk framework established by the regulators.65 The 
Federal Reserve and other financial regulators now supervise this risk 
                                                                                                             
force a financial conglomerate to reduce its size. See Discussion Draft, supra note 39, at 
19. 
 62. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 20–21. In the Discussion Draft, the 
Council is composed of the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of the Federal Re-
serve, the OCC, the SEC, the FDIC, the CFTC, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and 
the National Credit Union Administration, and has two nonvoting members (a state bank-
ing commissioner and a state insurance regulator). See Discussion Draft, supra note 39, at 
5–7. Among other things, the Council would issue prudential regulations dealing with 
systemic risk that financial regulators would have to adopt and it would identify financial 
firms and financial practices to be subject to heightened financial regulation by the Fed-
eral Reserve. See id. at 8–11. 
 63. See generally Rose & Hudgins, supra note 52, at 30. 
 64. See id. at 483–84. 
 65. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69294–98 (Dec. 7, 2007) (explaining how the internal 
model approach, which was used to measure market risk, is now extended to credit and 
operational risk). 
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assessment and all the risk management practices of the firms under their 
regulatory authority.66 
I have argued elsewhere that, for several reasons, risk management in 
the large financial groups and regulatory supervision of it failed greatly 
contributing to the financial crisis; indeed, this crisis is one of risk man-
agement.67 Risk management models for predicting losses in assets and 
from activities were often programmed with incomplete or faulty data 
that downplayed potential losses; risk managers ignored established me-
thods, such as stress testing and scenario analysis, to evaluate an institu-
tion’s preparedness for extreme scenarios; results were ignored or not 
taken seriously by financial institution executives and board members; 
and financial regulators accepted without criticism the risk models and 
processes of institutions and did not insist that they be improved when 
problems were found. In addition, risk managers and financial regulators 
ignored certain risks, such as the liquidity risk and risk from compensa-
tion design that became apparent in the crisis. 
Certainly, financial institutions and regulators now have “got religion” 
on risk management. Model shortcomings are being rectified; stress test-
ing and scenario analysis are being undertaken (indeed, the 19 largest 
financial groups had to undergo a government-designed stress test);68 
executives and boards are meeting with risk managers, who have as-
sumed new importance in their organizations; and regulators are examin-
ing the risk management practices of firms (this is what the government 
stress testing was designed to accomplish). Therefore, the Plan’s propos-
al that the Federal Reserve and the Oversight Council monitor risk man-
agement in financial institutions more closely must be understood as part 
of ongoing risk management reform efforts. 
Yet there are problems with the Plan’s reform of risk management be-
cause its fundamental approach is misguided and because it underesti-
mates the dangers arising from financial conglomerates. The solution of 
having an Oversight Council on the lookout for emerging risks is based 
upon an assumption that a group of regulators at the summit of the regu-
                                                                                                             
 66. See DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REG., FED. RESERVE BD., BANK HOLDING 
COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL supp. 28 § 4070 (2005) (discussing the Bank Holding 
Company Rating System that includes a rating on an “R” component, which represents 
risk management). 
 67. See Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable, supra note 53, at 739–45. 
 68. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2–4 (2009) (discussing the me-
thodology of the stress test); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 
SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS (2009) (discussing 
its results). 
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latory structure can rationally and panoramically survey financial institu-
tions and financial practices, detect emerging risks therein, and then re-
quire firms to eliminate or lessen the destructive effects of these risks. 
This perspective is the same one that characterizes current risk manage-
ment in Tier 1 financial institutions (and in most other financial institu-
tions, for that matter), where a risk oversight committee (of directors, 
executives, or a combination of both), with the help of a firm’s risk man-
agement department and its internal control department, assesses the 
risks of an enormous financial group and then manages them within risk 
parameters set down by the entire board. This perspective is thus “top 
down” and highly rationalist in nature. 
The financial crisis showed that this approach to risk analysis and 
management, when it is used exclusively, is faulty. Almost without ex-
ception, financial firms and regulators failed to see the risks of the asset-
backed securities that sparked the financial cataclysm. More importantly, 
they failed to anticipate the widespread illiquidity of assets and freezing 
up of transactions that followed the meltdown in the asset-backed securi-
ties market. They were unprepared for a phenomenon that is known as 
“tail dependence” in the risk literature.69 This means that an extreme 
event in one domain (such as a failure in the market for securities backed 
by subprime loans) can lead, in unexpected ways, to equally extreme 
consequences in other domains, such as in all asset-backed securities and 
then in all loans and securities, which in turn aggravates the decline in 
the original domain. 
Certainly, as mentioned above, risk management has improved in fi-
nancial institutions, and regulators are taking it more seriously. However, 
the top down approach may prevent both firms and regulators from deal-
ing with catastrophic risks, which matter the most and whose identifica-
tion is the whole point of the reform. It is likely that these risks will be 
identified in two ways: (i) by risk managers who are working closely 
with specific financial activities and are attuned to developments in the 
market and (ii) by risk managers who play out counterfactual or counte-
rintuitive scenarios with respect to their financial institutions and the fi-
nancial system. It appears that an Oversight Council, like a firm’s risk 
committee, is simply too removed from group (i) and must depend upon 
an extended chain of reporting, which may well attenuate any message 
about risk that it receives. It is also difficult to imagine that an Oversight 
Council (again like a firm’s risk committee) will take the time to serious-
                                                                                                             
 69. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 9–10 (2009). 
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ly consider imaginative scenarios, as opposed to standard risks with 
which its members are familiar. 
Moreover, even if the Oversight Council established reliable access to 
the risk managers “on the ground” and had the initiative to run, and take 
seriously, an analysis of unlikely scenarios, it is still unclear whether the 
Council would be able to predict with any accuracy the catastrophic risks 
arising from financial conglomerates. The Tier 1 groups are involved in 
so many financial activities and are interconnected in such complex ways 
that it is difficult for any person, firm, regulator or council of regulators 
to see all the emerging risks in them and to predict the consequences of 
acute negative events. As the crisis has shown, the tail dependence phe-
nomenon in this part of the financial sector and in the international finan-
cial system in which the conglomerates play such a great role is both par-
ticularly hard to predict and extremely destructive. In risk management, 
the financial conglomerates may be too complex to manage. 
Furthermore, the Oversight Council’s “top down” perspective on risk 
management maintains and even valorizes the status quo of financial 
conglomerates in the financial system. The message of the Plan is that 
risk management in these institutions can best be supervised only by a 
government body that is as centralized and powerful in regulation as they 
are in finance.70 From this perspective there is little acknowledgement of 
the possibility that, since catastrophic risks are difficult to identify and 
their consequences in the complex financial institutions are almost im-
possible to predict, the financial conglomerate might be too dangerous an 
institutional form of providing financial services.71 
C. Consumer Financial Protection 
A final example of the Plan’s financial reforms is the proposed crea-
tion of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”), which, as its 
name suggests, would be charged with protecting consumers in their ac-
quisition of financial products, such as credit, savings, payment, and oth-
er consumer financial products and services.72 This federal agency would 
                                                                                                             
 70. In reality, the Council is a political accommodation by the Obama Administra-
tion, which initially wanted to place the major power with respect to financial conglome-
rates with the Federal Reserve and to give the Council only an advisory role. The Discus-
sion Draft increases the importance of the Council. Yet my point about the reform as 
valorizing financial conglomerates holds, whether the Federal Reserve or the Oversight 
Council is in charge. 
 71. Again, as discussed earlier, there are signs that this alternative perspective on the 
financial conglomerates is beginning to be acknowledged, even in the Discussion Draft. 
See Discussion Draft, supra note 39. 
 72. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 55–63. 
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have the sole rule-making authority under existing consumer protection 
financial laws and have supervisory, examination, and enforcement au-
thority over financial institutions (even unregulated ones) in this domain. 
It would set a floor for consumer protection for the states, which could 
still impose higher standards, and it would cooperate with them in con-
sumer protection and enforcement efforts. Among other things, the 
CFPA would be directed to improve the financial industry’s disclosure 
on consumer financial products, to require that there be “plain vanilla” 
products in each financial area,73 to restrict unfair, abusive, or deceptive 
terms in consumer financial contracts (and, if necessary, to ban mandato-
ry arbitration in consumer financial contracts), and to impose fiduciary 
duties upon financial services providers.74 
The CFPA is inspired by the work of Professor Elizabeth Warren of 
Harvard Law School, one of the foremost consumer finance scholars and 
currently a member of the Congressional Oversight Panel of the Trea-
sury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.75 It is intended to replicate at the 
federal level the consumer protection and paternalistic orientation of the 
states. Under federal financial law, consumer protection is generally li-
mited to disclosure: for example, consumers must receive considerable 
disclosure about loan terms or savings or other account terms from 
banks, and banks are penalized if this disclosure is inadequate.76 The 
CFPA’s approach would be different and more along the lines of product 
safety regulation. The agency would evaluate a financial product, such as 
a loan, on its merits in order to determine whether it is beneficial to con-
sumers and whether its potential harms outweigh its benefits.77 If the 
regulator were to determine that the product or features of it were too 
toxic, it would not allow financial institutions to sell the product to con-
sumers, or it would require them to eliminate the product’s toxic fea-
tures.78 This approach echoes the traditional focus of state securities and 
                                                                                                             
 73. See id. at 70–71. 
 74. Under the Plan, the SEC’s consumer protection authority in investment products 
would also be enhanced, primarily with respect to disclosure before sale. See id. at 71–72. 
 75. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY: A J. OF IDEAS, 
(Summer 2007) (detailing the reasons we need a consumer financial safety commission). 
 76. This simplifies a complex area of the law. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601–93 (2006); Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–13 (2006). Similar-
ly, SEC regulation of financial products is essentially disclosure-based: under this theory 
investors should receive material information about an investment, no matter how specul-
ative it is, but should not be prohibited from investing in it. 
 77. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 55–58. 
 78. One thinks in this regards of certain home mortgages that were made to borrowers 
on the basis of no investment and no documented income, and that had higher interest 
rates that would kick in after an initial teaser rate. Such loans were almost certain to harm 
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banking departments that evaluate the merits of investments and loan 
products offered to their citizens.79 
It may seem inappropriate to lump the CFPA with the centralization of 
regulatory power in the Federal Reserve and the flawed approach to risk 
management as an additional example of problems in the Plan. Certainly, 
the focus on the consumer is a welcome political recognition that finan-
cial regulators failed in their consumer protection mission and were de-
voted almost solely to the well-being of the financial firms over which 
they have supervisory responsibility. The CFPA provides consumers 
with a regulator whose mandate is only to protect their interests, rather 
than those of certain members of the financial industry. Under the Plan 
the CFPA would be a regulatory counterpart to the Federal Reserve, for 
it would be the “super-regulator” of consumer interests in finance just as 
the Federal Reserve would be for financial firms and the system. One 
obvious criticism (which I have expressed elsewhere)80 is that, even 
though financial regulators would continue their consumer protection 
activities under the direction and guidance of the CFPA, that role may 
atrophy. The establishment of the CFPA “liberates” financial regulators 
by reinforcing their belief that their primary focus should be on their part 
of the financial industry.81 
                                                                                                             
the consumer, except in the limited circumstances of a continued rise in real estate values. 
See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-848R, Characteristics and Perfor-
mance of Nonprime Mortgages, (2009). 
 79. See Broome & Markham, supra note 43, at 419–33 (discussing Georgia’s efforts 
to regulate subprime loans). 
 80. See James Fanto, The Rationale and Cautionary Remarks on the Proposed Fed-
eral Consumer Financial Product Regulator, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3652 (2009). 
 81. This may be no great loss, given the existing orientation of the regulators and the 
fact that this Administration is more consumer-oriented than the last Administration. 
However, the country’s political orientation will inevitably shift over time. If a future 
Administration were less devoted to consumer financial protection, it could weaken the 
power of the CFPA by senior level appointments. By then, no financial regulator could 
step up to fill the consumer protection role. 
  It should also be noted that the enactment of legislation authorizing the CFPA is 
by no means certain. There were initially two bills in the House with differences in the 
structure and mandate of the CFPA. See Jewel Edwards, Energy and Commerce Passes 
CFPA Bill, Splits with Financial Services Panel’s Version, 93 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 841 
(2009). The version from the House Financial Services Committee was H.R. 3126. As 
such, it is different in important respects from the version originally introduced on behalf 
of the Administration. For example, H.R. 3126 does not allow the CFPA to require finan-
cial institutions to offer consumers “plain vanilla” financial products and the bill excludes 
certain parties (e.g., automobile dealers who offer credit to consumers) from coverage. 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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Yet the centralization of consumer protection in the CFPA raises a crit-
icism that is related to the earlier discussion of risk management. Many 
consumer financial and investment abuses, just as many risks to financial 
firms, can be detected best by people who are “close to the action” of the 
firm. In the case of consumer abuses, this means by regulators who deal 
directly with consumers. That is why state regulators, rather than federal 
financial regulators, have generally identified financial abuses of con-
sumers first. The CFPA proposal thus suffers from the same “top down” 
perspective as does the proposal for expanding the Federal Reserve’s 
systemic risk authority. That is, it reflects the belief that a centralizing 
authority with panoramic vision is best at dealing with consumer finan-
cial abuses. It is true that the Plan does not threaten or undercut state 
power in consumer protection. It explicitly discourages preemption, per-
mits states to offer greater consumer protection than what would be pro-
vided under federal law, encourages state and federal cooperation in con-
sumer protection, and even allows states to enforce provisions of new 
consumer financial protection laws that would be enacted with the estab-
lishment of the CFPA.82 That approach to consumer protection would be 
“bottom up,” which would be much more valuable in detecting and ad-
dressing consumer abuses.83 
Finally, in a perverse way the CFPA reaffirms the importance of the 
financial conglomerates, just as do other aspects of the Plan. Advocates 
for the CFPA clearly believe that consumers need such an agency to pro-
tect them from the conglomerates, which have their protectors in the cur-
rent federal financial regulators and in a strengthened Federal Reserve. 
The assumption behind the CFPA is that the Tier 1 institutions are the 
status quo and here to stay, and therefore the only recourse for consum-
ers is to seek protection in a powerful, consumer-oriented federal agency. 
Another option, such as keeping financial institutions smaller (as dis-
cussed below), would obviate the need for a supercharged federal con-
sumer regulator.84 
                                                                                                             
 82. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 60–61. H.R. 3126 preserves this initial 
thrust of the Plan. See Subtitle D—Preservation of State Law, H.R. 3126, at §§ 141–50. 
 83. A concern remains that a centralized, powerful federal regulator would gradually 
assert more and more authority and could eventually encroach upon the jurisdiction of 
state regulators. Then, if political winds change and the CFPA becomes less assertive as 
to consumer protection, state financial regulators might not be ready and capable of deal-
ing with consumer abuses. 
 84. Legislation might still be needed, as in H.R. 3126, to reaffirm the importance of 
state consumer protection and to protect it against preemption efforts by federal financial 
regulators. 
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
It is fair to ask whether the Obama Administration will propose any 
transformational reform of financial institutions if there is no further 
meltdown in the financial markets. Many financial conglomerates that 
survived the financial collapse with the extraordinary help of the Trea-
sury, the Federal Reserve, and other federal financial regulators are 
boasting about their profits (generally made from proprietary trading on 
the basis of cheap funds available from the Federal Reserve and leve-
rage), have paid back their TARP funds,85 and are reasserting themselves 
by offering a revisionist history of the meltdown (“we never needed gov-
ernment support).86 They are now trying to remove the teeth from pro-
posed regulation.87 The crisis has in fact made the financial sector even 
more concentrated with the new class of Tier 1 institutions that would 
receive the government’s designation as “systemically important,” are 
implicitly regarded as “too big to fail,” and can thus raise funds at a dis-
count.88 Financial regulators and those in the current Administration re-
sponsible for financial policy come from or have close ties to financial 
conglomerates and are steeped in the ideology of finance.89 Thus, as ex-
plained in the previous part, the reforms proposed in the Plan reflect this 
ideology and reinforce the position of the financial conglomerates.90 
I offer below one thought for reform that comes from a perspective that 
is critical of the current dominance of financial conglomerates and that is 
skeptical of the virtues of finance in the United States. The primary goal 
of this reform would be to break up the financial conglomerates on the 
ground that, because of their complexity and rent-seeking, they pose too 
many risks to the financial system, the economy and political well-being 
of this country. This proposal would benefit the market for financial ser-
                                                                                                             
 85. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Buys TARP Warrants from Treasury for $950 Million, 
21 BANK. REP. (BNA) 1160 (2009). 
 86. See Joe Nocera, Short Memories at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1 
(discussing revisionist history of financial crisis espoused by Goldman). But see Letter 
from Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman & CEO, Goldman Sachs Group, to Barney Frank, 
Chairman, and Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, H. Fin. Serv. Comm. (June 16, 2009) 
(expressing Goldman’s appreciation for government support). 
 87. See Joe Nocera, Have Banks No Shame?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at B1 (dis-
cussing bank resistance to reform). 
 88. See David A. Moss, An Ounce of Prevention, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2009, AT 
25, 27. 
 89. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Obama Aide Declines Visit to Bank Board, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20, 2009, at B1 (discussing ties between Obama’s Chief of Staff and close friend, 
Rahm Emmanuel, and financiers, particularly the CEO of JP Morgan Chase). 
 90. As noted above, however, there are those in the Administration who are begin-
ning to look more critically at the conglomerates. 
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vices because the break-up of these institutions would allow for the 
growth and development of smaller, more specialized financial institu-
tions. As will be explained below, this reform goal does accept the ne-
cessity of one of the proposals in the Plan, which is to empower a federal 
regulator to wind up the Tier 1 institutions. Following the discussion of 
this goal, this Part briefly emphasizes key disadvantages of the Plan’s 
alternative reform approach of allowing the conglomerates to continue to 
exist as such while regulating them more. 
A. The End of the Financial Conglomerate 
The goal of reform should be to break up the financial conglomerates, 
given the unacceptable economic and social destruction that they cause, 
unless—what is unlikely—they can survive without government subsi-
dies. The reform would have to include legislation that would undo, 
wholly or partially, the creation of the financial holding company that 
ratified the existence of the financial conglomerate. The legislation 
would separate the parts of a conglomerate with a deposit-taking func-
tion91 from many of the investment banking, insurance, financial instru-
ment trading, and proprietary trading activities that have proven to add to 
the complexity and thus to pose the most danger to the conglomerates.92 
It would give bank holding company status, and the benefits of Federal 
Reserve support that comes with it, only to institutions with this tradi-
tional banking focus. This legislation would thus return banking regula-
tion to the pre-Gramm-Leach-Bliley situation of separate, often limited 
purpose financial institutions and would require financial regulators 
again to engage in line-drawing about the permissible functions of the 
regulated firms.93 These restrictions and regulatory assertiveness, rather 
                                                                                                             
 91. Conglomerate parts with deposit-taking functions include banks or savings and 
loans, or the equivalent of consumer deposits in money market funds, and the govern-
ment insurance that goes with them. 
 92. Naturally, this legislation would be complicated, for it would have to decide 
which financial activities (e.g., selling asset-backed securities) would be permissible to 
the new, restricted bank holding companies. 
 93. This proposal echoes those made by others (particularly Simon Johnson) who 
argue for a separation between “simpler” financial firms receiving government support 
and another financial sector that would not have this support, but would be regulated. 
See, e.g., Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Address to Scottish business 
organizations at Edinborough, Scotland (Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf; ALEXANDER G. 
HALDANE & PIERGIORGIO ALESSANDRI, BANKING ON THE STATE (Sept. 25, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf; Moss, 
supra note 88; Ingo Walter, The New Case for Functional Separation in Wholesale Fi-
nancial Services, 30–31 (N.Y.U. Stern School Bus., Working Paper, 2009), available at 
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than market freedom in financial services as exemplified by risk-based 
capital regulation, are the price that must be paid for financial and eco-
nomic stability. 
Pending legislative change, financial regulators have the authority to 
impose onerous regulations upon financial conglomerates so that they 
will be forced to pay for the numerous kinds of support that they receive 
and for the risks that they create, and so that they will find themselves 
more restricted in their activities.94 The purpose of this changed regulato-
ry approach is to push the conglomerates to transform themselves. On the 
basis of their federal subsidies and the risks that the conglomerates pose 
to the financial system, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) would also impose a high deposit insurance premium on the 
institutions that receive FDIC insurance.95 For similar reasons, the Trea-
sury and federal financial regulators would impose higher fees for the 
conglomerates’ participation in the support programs for financial insti-
tutions, which include the guarantee on debt issued by the firms, and 
their participation in such programs as the Term-Asset Backed Loan Fa-
cility and the Public-Private Investment Partnership (which removes 
troubled loans and securities from the banks’ books).96 Additionally, if 
financial regulators accept that it is difficult, if not impossible, to set 
adequate risk-based capital requirements “scientifically” for these con-
glomerates, given their complexity and the accompanying uncertainty 
about “tail risks,” regulators could impose a special capital charge on the 
conglomerates as a safeguard.97 In other words, the financial conglome-
                                                                                                             
http://ssrn.com/abstact=1442148. But see CARMINE DI NOIA ET AL., KEEP IT SIMPLE: 
POLICY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 75 (2009); Lawrence White, Lesson From 
the Debacle of ‘07–‘08 for Financial Regulation and Its Overhaul,  21–22 (N.Y.U. Stern 
School Bus., Working Paper, 2008). 
 94. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e). 
 95. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2010). The FDIC has relative freedom here since the 
assessments are risk-based, but it would have to deal with a statute that requires it not to 
discriminate among banks on the basis of their size. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(D) 
(2010). 
 96. Many of the initiatives are discussed on the Dep’t of Treasury’s website. See U.S. 
DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL SECURITY FACT SHEET 1, 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf. See also James Fanto, The Trea-
sury’s Efforts to Jumpstart Small Business Lending and TALF, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 
3399 (2009). For a discussion of the FDIC’s guarantee program of senior unsecured debt, 
see FDIC: Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/faq.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
Again, it would be difficult to justify legally a complete restriction on the conglomerates’ 
participation in these programs. 
 97. This could be done through the imposition of a higher basic capital ratio, often 
known as a leverage ratio, that is set based on an institution’s assets, without any adjust-
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rates would not be able to control the capital determination process 
through their own risk-based models. With the imposition of these meas-
ures, among others,98 rather than being at the receiving end of numerous 
kinds of government support, the financial conglomerates would have to 
make significant payments for the privilege of their existence. This might 
well cause them to shrink in size.99 
The government’s gradual withdrawal of support from the conglome-
rates and the imposition of more exacting regulations and capital charges 
upon them would likely result in a gradual break-up of the firms. In a 
worst case scenario, it would lead to a sell-off of the shares and debt of 
these institutions, when the market perceives that the conglomerates now 
have to pay for the government guarantee that they receive, and perhaps 
a collapse of the weakest among them.100 As was seen in the financial 
crisis, there will likely be serious disruptions to the financial system, if 
one or more of the financial conglomerates fail without an orderly reso-
lution process. This would suggest that the part of the Plan that is de-
signed to give the Treasury, with the assistance of the Federal Reserve, 
the FDIC, and the SEC, the power to take over and wind up financial 
conglomerates that pose systemic risk should take precedence in finan-
cial reform.101 Again, from this Article’s perspective, a special resolution 
regime for the conglomerates would only highlight their importance in 
the financial system. However, if, in effect, government regulation con-
                                                                                                             
ment for risk. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(b) (2009) (leverage ratio for national banks). On a 
special leverage ratio proposal, see, e.g., FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, OVERVIEW OF 
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE LONDON SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY 5–6 (2009). Alternatively, a special capital charge 
for complexity and risk could be added to the capital amount determined through the risk-
based capital process. See DI NOIA, supra note 93, at 58–60; OLIVER HART & LUIGI 
ZINGALES, A NEW CAPITAL REGULATION FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21–23 
(Chicago Booth Working Paper No. 09-36, Sept. 2009). 
 98. Another measure would be to have financial conglomerates issue “contingent” 
debt, which could be transformed into equity in certain events (e.g., when a firm’s regula-
tory capital fell below a certain threshold). For a critical article on this concept, see Gil-
lian Tett, The Sweet Fix of CoCos?, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009. 
 99. As noted earlier, even the Treasury Secretary has announced support for this capi-
tal approach that would have this effect. See, e.g., Geithner Testimony, supra note 61, at 
3–4. See also TREASURY DEPARTMENT, PRINCIPLES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BANKING FIRMS 10–11 (2009) 
(supporting both a special capital assessment on large firms and the increased leverage 
ratio concept). 
 100. On the other hand, the market may perceive that the financial conglomerates, like 
industrial conglomerates, obscure the value of their parts, which would make break-ups 
financially attractive. 
 101. See A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 76–78. 
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tributed to the creation of the conglomerates in the first place, it should 
be responsible for dealing with the fallout from their demise.102 
As a result of these reforms, we shall return to a time of smaller, more 
focused financial institutions. But this is likely to be for the better. For, 
then, the financial sector will be what it is supposed to be: a provider of 
capital raising, risk management, and other financial services to busi-
nesses and to consumers, rather than being rent seeking and economical-
ly and politically destabilizing.103 It will also not be allowed continuously 
to produce crises that have destructive effects on the economy.104 
B. A Second Best Approach 
One could, of course, argue that the above reform should not be at-
tempted because of the threat to systemic stability. Financial institutions 
(and the economy) have just emerged from a crisis and remain in a pre-
carious situation. It would therefore be foolhardy to trigger a new 
upheaval and potentially a recurrence of systemic risk. Therefore, it 
could be contended that it makes sense to pursue reforms that are incre-
mental and thus less drastic than a break-up of financial conglomerates. 
This approach to reform would include many of those ideas proposed by 
the Plan and the implementing legislation, as discussed above. The Ob-
ama Administration appears to be taking this approach and to accept the 
conglomerates as a reality in finance. More recently, as also explained 
above, the Administration is taking a harder line on the conglomerates 
and contemplating that at least some of them could eventually be reduced 
in size and even eliminated.105 From a pragmatic perspective, it wants the 
dismantling to happen gradually and in an orderly way. 
The main problem with this approach, as attractive as it may seem in 
its pragmatism and middle-of-the-road quality, is that it is unlikely to 
reduce the influence of and thus the dangers posed by the financial con-
glomerates to the financial system, the economy, and the polity. As fi-
nancial institutions and the financial system have stabilized, the conglo-
merates argue that no significant reforms to financial institutions are 
needed, because the crisis was due to external (i.e., exogenous) factors. 
Accordingly, they show their cooperation by agreeing to technical re-
                                                                                                             
 102. This is not the place to discuss the resolution provisions of the bills moving 
through Congress. See H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. §§ 171–72 (2009); Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act, 111th Cong. §§ 201–10 (S. Banking Comm. 2009). 
 103. On the rent seeking of finance, see, e.g., Augar, supra note 17, at 204–21. 
 104. On the crises generated by the financial system, see the classic account by Hyman 
Minsky. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 77–106 (1986, 
rereleased 2008). 
 105. See supra notes 32, 65–67 and accompanying text. 
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forms, which arguably respond to regulatory lacunae revealed by the fi-
nancial crisis. These are, for example, the Plan’s enhancements to the 
Federal Reserve’s oversight, risk management improvements, and revi-
sions to capital standards. These reforms can be “sold” to the public as 
the necessary technological solutions for complex activities. They can 
also be politically satisfying to financial regulators and even legislators, 
who can then present themselves as responding to the crisis without di-
rectly confronting the power of the financial conglomerates. Moreover, it 
is likely that, rather than cynically protecting financial conglomerates, 
regulators and legislators believe that this is the best and most principled 
approach to take, for they have been indoctrinated by the ideology of 
finance. 
The basic problem with this approach is that it gives the financial con-
glomerates the time to take control of the reform process. For example, 
in general they will likely agree to refinements to capital requirements 
for liquidity and other issues arising from the crisis. Yet reforms to capi-
tal alone still allow conglomerates considerable operational freedom and 
do not eliminate the dangers posed by their size and complexity. Since 
capital will remain risk-based and will be calculated on the basis of the 
firms’ own risk models, they will ultimately control the capital determi-
nation, however much it is reformed (unless a high non-risk-based leve-
rage ratio is imposed). Moreover, the ever increasing complexity of the 
products and activities engaged in by financial conglomerates plays into 
their hands when they are modeling their risk and determining their capi-
tal, since regulators cannot offer any credible alternatives to these models 
to evaluate the risks of a conglomerate’s activities and investments. In 
sum, the catastrophic risks arising from the size of the firms and the 
complexities of their interconnected activities would not be addressed by 
this gradualist approach to reform. This result would argue for the alter-
native reform discussed in the preceding sub-Part, which is to break up 
the conglomerates as the only way to address their power and to elimi-
nate the dangers posed by them. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that the Plan maintains, and emphasizes 
the importance of, financial conglomerates engaged in a broad array of 
financial activities and would extend regulation to similar, but now unre-
gulated, financial institutions like hedge fund groups, private equity 
firms, and insurance groups. The Article explained that the Plan is ani-
mated by an ideology of finance, which the major political parties and 
financial regulators have come to accept over the past three decades de-
spite the economic and social destruction that finance has caused to the 
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country. It discussed how several features of the Plan—its enhancement 
of the Federal Reserve’s power, its proposed improvements to risk man-
agement and even the establishment of the CFPA—all reinforce the cur-
rent dominance of financial conglomerates in our financial system. The 
Article then outlined an alternative reform approach that would have as 
its goal the breakup of these conglomerates, an approach that would de-
mand legislation in the long term, but that could be undertaken now by 
financial regulators. The Article also argued that this reform would pro-
duce smaller, but less troubling, financial institutions. It finally con-
tended that an alternative to this kind of reform, which would impose 
restrictions upon the conglomerates and eliminate the weaker of them—
an approach now being espoused by the Obama Administration—would 
not eliminate the dangers that they pose, because the conglomerates 
would likely control regulations emerging from the reform, based as the 
regulations are on the conglomerates’ own risk models. 
Several assumptions animate this Article. The first is that the financial 
conglomerates destabilize the financial system and the economy because 
they are involved in so many financial activities and have such intercon-
nections with other firms that it is impossible for them to manage their 
risks effectively and thus to prevent dramatic spillovers and externalities 
into that system and the economy. A second, which has been alluded to 
but not explored at length, is that the conglomerates are also politically 
troubling because many of their activities have little to do with financing 
businesses and consumers, but with producing rents for themselves, and 
that they have thus contributed to significant economic disparities in the 
country, which are ultimately not conducive to a stable political system. 
It is therefore unfortunate that the Plan, and the Obama Administration, 
accept financial conglomerates as the status quo and appear, at least until 
recently, oblivious to their dangers and reluctant to rein them in. There-
fore, additional crises generated by the conglomerates, likely even worse 
than the one we have just lived through, await us in the future, unless 
these institutions are broken up. 
 
